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I. Introduction
In recent decades, in light of the increasing fragmentation of econo- 
mies expedited by rapid globalization, outsourcing has become a trend 
in organizational forms for modern firms in the entire industries. A 
recent article in the Economist (2008) reports on the exceptionally fast 
growth of outsourcing of late. For example, in the 1940s, outsourcing 
was estimated to yield only 20% of the GDP of the US, but in the 
1990s, the proportion tripled to 60%. In the automobile industry in the 
1990s, successful firms, such as Toyota, Honda, and Chrysler, were 
outsourcing around 70% of value-added in contrast with the least pro- 
fitable firms, such as General Motors, that were outsourcing only 30%. 
In the context of business strategy, most managers have to decide on 
whether to produce their products in their own plants or subcontract 
them to the outsourcer. Through the development of Information and 
Communication Technology, outsourcing entails not only production ac- 
tivities but almost all other areas of firm activities, including human re- 
source management and research and development.
One of the reasons for choosing outsourcing is technological efficiency. 
When the outsourcer possesses advanced technology, the manufacturer 
can share more profit with the outsourcer even if it cannot monopolize 
profit. Nevertheless, outsourcing has disadvantages in that production 
activities become a black box for manufacturers. If manufacturers are 
not aware of the technological information outsourcers possess, they 
are required to pay the outsourcers rent for the extra information. 
Therefore, manufacturers face a trade-off between gain from the efficient 
technology and loss from paying the information rent. When a firm 
decides on in-house production instead of outsourcing, although a man- 
ufacturer can obtain the entire profit, it loses the gain from the cost 
efficiency of outsourcing. When outsourcing is selected, although a man- 
ufacturer can acquire the gain from cost efficiency, it is required to 
share the gain with the outsourcer.
Considering this trade-off in this paper, we examine the form of pro- 
duction wherein a manufacturer chooses between in-house production 
and outsourcing when faced with cost uncertainty and competition with 
a rival manufacturer in a differentiated goods market. When the man- 
agement decides on selecting organizational forms, technological unce- 
rtainty on production activities often ensues. Thus, a manufacturer faces 
uncertainty when choosing between in-house production and outsourc- 
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ing. Introducing the uncertainty of production cost into the model, we 
investigate how the degree of cost efficiency in outsourcing affects the 
choice of the form of production by a manufacturer with cost uncer- 
tainty. Moreover, because almost all modern firms are in a competitive 
position, they have to choose organizational forms and take the strategic 
effect of its decision on other rival firms into consideration. We examine 
how the choice of outsourcing versus in-house production is affected 
by the degree of product differentiation by addressing the market com- 
petition between manufacturers in conjunction with cost uncertainty.
Outsourcing is a key aspect of modern industrial production, and it 
has sparked considerable interest in the economic literature. Thus, there 
is a huge bulk of existing literature on outsourcing under different mar- 
ket conditions. As one of the leading papers, Grossman and Helpman 
(2005) present a framework based on which firms decide where to out- 
source in a general equilibrium model. In their model, outsourcing is 
related to relationship-specific investments governed by incomplete con- 
tracts. They clarify the determinants of the location of outsourcing. 
Grossman and Helpman (2004) compare in-house production and out- 
sourcing within the context of a moral hazard wherein a firm is con- 
strained by the nature of the offered contract to an outsourcer. They 
clarify the relationship between the productivity of the firm and the choice 
of organizational forms. Recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) 
develop a tractable model of offshoring/outsourcing based on global trad- 
able tasks.
Several papers deal with the choice of outsourcing versus in-house 
production for firms. Kamien et al. (1989) analyze the situation where 
firms compete in a Bertrand duopolistic competition in the first stage 
and have the option to choose subcontracting in the second stage. They 
examine how subsequent subcontracting production influences the initial 
price competition. Alyson (2006) examines the choice of in-house pro- 
duction and outsourcing by multinationals using a general equilibrium 
model by focusing on the varying availabilities of skilled labor among 
countries. He clarifies that the relative amount of highly skilled labor 
in the country affects the choice between in-house production and out- 
sourcing. Nickerson and Bergh (1999) explore a duopoly model with 
Cournot competition to analyze the choice of organizational form by com- 
peting firms. They investigate how strategic interaction and governance 
costs affect organizational choice. Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007) find 
that an increase in market uncertainty leads to a higher proportion of 
partial outsourcing by applying a real options approach.
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A prevailing view posits that outsourcing is fostered by the intensi- 
fication of competition brought about by globalization. There are several 
articles that present the positive relationship between the intensifying 
competition and increase in outsourcing. Shy and Stenbacka (2003) 
focus on the strategic aspect of the design of organizational forms and 
show how competition in the input market affects production efficiency 
in a differentiated final goods market. They clarify the relationship be- 
tween the intensity of competition in the input market and choice of 
organizational forms. In a closely related article, Shy and Stenbacka 
(2005) investigate the outsourcing decisions of firms when production 
requires a large number of inputs and find the optimal proportion of 
partial outsourcing, which is regarded as the equilibrium fraction of 
outsourced inputs. They show that intensified competition in a final 
goods market enlarges the set of outsourced components because the 
advantage of marginal monitoring costs by outsourcing is increased due 
to intensifying competition.
In contrast to Shy and Stenbacka (2003) that analyzed the relation- 
ship between outsourcing and the intensity of competition in the input 
market, our paper focuses on competition in the final goods market. 
Shy and Stenbacka (2003, 2005) and Alvarez and Stenbacka (2007) also 
analyze partial outsourcing to examine the optimal proportion of in- 
house production and outsourcing. In particular, Shy and Stenbacka 
(2005) demonstrate how intensifying competition enlarges the propor- 
tion of partial outsourcing. To justify the analysis of partial outsourc- 
ing, the existing literature presumes that firms can choose the parame- 
ters for organizational forms continuously. However, as the theory of 
organizational design suggests, firms often have to choose the parame- 
ters for organizational forms from discrete variables. Roberts (2004) 
introduces “non-convexity” in the set of available choices, implying that 
choices are not infinitely divisible as a key concept for organization 
design. For example, Roberts (2004) states that the firm cannot have a 
fractional number of plants; it either enters a market or does not. How- 
ever, indivisibilities abound in the set of alternatives when firms decide. 
Similarly, in the case of decision making on organizational forms of firms, 
the choice between in-house production and outsourcing cannot be made 
at an intermediate level. Thus, partial outsourcing is not an option for 
firms. In accordance with the idea of non-convexity, this paper compares 
in-house production with outsourcing as a discrete choice.
Contrary to existing literature on outsourcing, this paper explores a 
model that can be utilized in deciding which organizational forms to 
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use with asymmetric information along with uncertainty. The seminal 
articles analyze the situation where the outsourcing firm is aware of 
the ability of the outsourcer in advance before offering the outsourcing 
contract. In contrast, this paper analyzes the case of asymmetric infor- 
mation between a manufacturer and outsourcer. Thus, our paper at- 
tempts to examine how the expected profit of the manufacturer is af- 
fected by the information rent paid to an outsourcer when the manu- 
facturer is unaware of the ability of the outsourcer. This paper explores 
a duopoly model to address not only the uncertainty in the choice of 
organizational forms but also the asymmetric information between a 
manufacturer and an outsourcer regarding the marginal cost of out- 
sourcing. Contrary to existing literature where the monitoring cost of 
outsourcing is provided exogenously as a strictly increasing convex func- 
tion regarding the number of outsourcers, the present study analyzes 
the monitoring cost as the information rent paid explicitly to the out- 
sourcer.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on delegation, as in the 
seminal papers by Katz (1991) and Fershtman et al. (1991). They focus 
on the strategic delegation under which the owner offers an incentive 
contract to the manager to determine the intensity of competition. How- 
ever, in most of the existing literature, the delegating owner is already 
aware of the ability of the manager in advance before offering the con- 
tract and the hidden information of a delegated agent is not addressed.1 
In the model, hidden information is a key difference of outsourcing from 
in-house production. Thus, we analyze what will occur if there is asym- 
metric information between a manufacturer and its out-sourcer. Recen- 
tly, Martimort and Piccolo (2010) analyze the strategic value of quantity 
forcing contracts in the competing manufacturer-retailer hierarchies. They 
show that manufacturers may leave contracts to retailers incomplete. 
However, the information structure in our paper differs from that in 
their paper. They analyze the situation where the private information 
for retailers is perfectly correlated. In contrast, our paper deals with the 
situation where the private information possessed by outsourcers is not 
correlated. Moreover, we focus on the strategic effect caused by hidden 
information alone during outsourcing.
1 Using a setting similar to that used in this paper, Hamada (2005) deals 
with the relationship between the profitability of the manufacturer and its deci- 
sion on whether to observe the hidden information of a delegated agent in the 
delegation game. However, the choice of production form by the manufacturer is 
not considered.
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Endogenizing the monitoring cost by introducing asymmetric infor- 
mation into the model, our paper shows that the degree of product 
differentiation does not affect the choice between in-house production 
and outsourcing. If the degree of product differentiation has an inverse 
relation to the intensity of competition, the result suggests that, re- 
gardless of the intensity of competition, the manufacturer decides on 
outsourcing if the degree of the cost efficiency of outsourcing exceeds 
certain thresholds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II intro- 
duces the model that allows each manufacturer to choose its organiza- 
tional form of production when faced with cost uncertainty and com- 
petition with a rival manufacturer in a differentiated goods market. 
Section III derives the quantity and expected profit in the Cournot equi- 
librium. Section IV compares the expected profits of in-house produc- 
tion and outsourcing and presents the main results regarding the rela- 
tionship between the degree of product differentiation and the choice of 
production forms. Section Ⅴ presents the concluding remarks.
II. The Model
Consider that in a differentiated goods market, there are two manu- 
facturers whose products have brand royalty. The manufacturer, Mi    
(i＝1, 2), deliberates on whether to opt for in-house production or out- 
sourcing to produce a good. If in-house production is the preferred 
option, Mi realizes the production activities for itself. If outsourcing is 
decided on, Mi hires an outsourcer and delegates to the outsourcer, Oi, 
the responsibility of producing the brand product exclusively.
The product is produced with a constant marginal cost, regardless of 
the form of production chosen. To analyze the choice under cost un- 
certainty, we assume that at the time of choosing the production form 
between in-house production and outsourcing, Mi is unaware of not 
only the marginal cost of the outsourcer but also of its own. After 
choosing the production form, when in-house production is chosen, Mi 
duly recognizes its own marginal cost θ i
M
. When outsourcing is the 
preferred option, Mi searches for an outsourcer from several potential 
outsourcers before it learns of its own marginal cost. In outsourcing, a 
manufacturer possessing brand royalty with regard to differentiated goods 
delegates production activities to an outsourcer exclusively. After an 
outsourcer is chosen but before the contract is offered, the chosen Oi 
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determines its marginal cost through the preparation of production. 
When Mi offers a delegating contract to Oi, Mi is unaware of the 
marginal cost of the delegated outsourcer, θ i
O, while Oi knows its own 
marginal cost, θ i
O. That is, θ i
O constitutes the private information for Oi. 
We refer to θ i
O
 as Oi’s type. We denote the situation where Mi (resp. M－i) 
chooses in-house production or outsourcing by ω (resp. ω ’) ∈ {M, O }, 
where M (resp. O) denotes in-house production by the manufacturer 
(resp. outsourcing).
Mi is unaware of the true value of marginal cost when choosing the 
production form; hence, at the decision stage, Mi forecasts that θ i
ω; ω∈
{M, O} follows a certain ex ante probability distribution. For analytical 
simplification, we assume that both manufacturers face an identical pro- 
bability structure; that is, θ1
ω and θ2
ω follow identical and independent 
distributions. However, it should be noted that the probability distribu- 
tion when in-house production is chosen differs from that when out- 
sourcing is chosen. θ i
M
 and θ i
O
 follow independent but different proba- 
bility distributions.
The distribution lies in θ i
M
∈[0, θ ̅] and θ iO∈[0, sθ ̅]; 0＜θ ̅＜1, 0＜s＜1. 
As θ ̅ (resp. sθ ̅) denotes the interval of the uncertain marginal cost θ iM 
(resp. θ i
O
), s represents (the inverse of ) the degree of cost efficiency of 
outsourcing. As s decreases, outsourcing becomes more cost efficient 
than in-house production evaluated at the ex ante stage where there is 
cost uncertainty. f
ω (θ i
ω ) and Fω (θ i
ω ) denote the density and cumulative 
probability functions, respectively. The probability structure constitutes 
common knowledge for both manufacturers (and if they exist, out- 
sourcers). f
ω(θ i
ω ) is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable 
function. Moreover, we assume that the monotone hazard rate condition 
(MHRC) is satisfied for θ i
O
, that is, d[FO(θ i
O




＞0. We define 






)/ f O (θ i
O
).
Mi in in-house production or Oi in outsourcing faces duopolistic 
competition. Thus, when both manufacturers choose outsourcing, each 
outsourcer competes with the rival outsourcer as a delegated agent in 
a differentiated goods market. The competition occurs in a Cournot fash- 
ion. The variables qi and pi denote the quantity and price of good i, re- 
spectively. The inverse demand function of good i is given by 
i i i i ip q q q q( , ) 1 ,γ− −= − −                       (1)
where γ ∈(0, 1) represents the degree of product differentiation between 
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two product-differentiated goods. We assume the conditions wherein all 
types of marginal costs ensure positive quantity (which will be discussed 
later). The ex post total profit is represented as follows:
2( , ; ) ( ( , ) ) (1 ) .i i i i i i i i i i i i i iq q p q q q q q q q
ω ω ωπ θ θ θ γ− − −= − = − − −         (2)
As Mi knows its own marginal cost, θ i
M
, after in-house production is 
selected, Mi maximizes its own profit with regard to quantity. When the 
contract is offered after outsourcing is selected, Mi is unaware of θ i
O
. Mi 
is required to offer the contract to Oi, such that the incentive compati- 
bility constraint is satisfied to induce the true information on θ i
O
. The 
offered contract depends on the quantity level qi, which is assumed to 
be verifiable. In accordance with the revelation principle, we concen- 
trate on the direct truth-telling mechanism, (qi (θ ̂iO), ti (θ ̂iO)), where the 
quantity level and transfer (qi, ti ) are self-selected depending on the 
type reported to Mi by Oi, θ ̂iO. The contract is represented as a function 
from the reported type θ ̂iO to (qi, ti ). Thus, when Oi reports its type θ ̂iO 
to Mi, the quantity level qi (θ ̂iO) is implemented, and Oi pays Mi the 
transfer ti(θ ̂iO) as brand royalty depending on θ ̂iO. Oi decides whether to 
accept the offered contract. If the contract is accepted, Oi supplies the 
brand product for Mi in a differentiated goods market. If the contract is 
rejected, Oi obtains the reservation payoff, which is normalized to 0.
Mi is required to commit to the contract in advance. It is assumed 
that the rival counterpart cannot observe this contract ti(qi ) when of- 
fering the contract, and Mi cannot write the contract based on q－i 
implemented by M－i because the information on the rival cannot be 
verified. The ex post total profit is denoted by π i(qi, q－i; θ i
O
). In out- 
sourcing, Mi’s profit is the transfer paid from Oi. Mi and Oi cannot 
know the rival’s cost, θ－i, when the contract is offered; thus, Mi maxi- 
mizes the expected value of the transfer ti. Oi maximizes the expected 
value of (π i－ti ). In the offered contract, Oi is guaranteed more than the 
reservation payoff because individual rationality has to be satisfied.
The timing of the model is as follows. In the first stage, Mi chooses 
in-house production or outsourcing. In this stage, Mi does not know its 
own type, θ i
M. If outsourcing is chosen, Mi chooses an outsourcer from 
several potential outsourcers. Before offering the contract in the next 
stage, the chosen Oi knows its type θ i
O
, although Mi is unaware of θ i
O
. 
In the second stage, if in-house production is chosen in the first stage, 
Mi recognizes θ i
M
 and decides the quantity level to maximize the ex- 
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pected profit. If outsourcing is chosen in the first stage, Mi offers the 
outsourcing contract to Oi. Oi decides whether to accept the contract. If 
the contract is rejected, Oi obtains the reservation payoff. However, if 
the contract is accepted, Mi implements the quantity level qi (θ ̂iO) and 
receives the brand royalty ti (θ ̂iO) following the reported type by Oi.
Regardless of the form of production chosen, the quantity levels (qi,  
q－i) are decided upon simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The solu- 
tion follows the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
III. The Quantity and Expected Profit in Equilibrium
A. In-house Production






i ); θ i
M
), with regard to qi, 
as Mi recognizes θ i
M
.2 Using the first-order condition (FOC), the reaction 
function is obtained as follows:
M
M i i i i
i i i i i i
E qq q E q 1 ( )( ( ); ) .
2
ω
ω θ γ θθ θ
′
′ − − −
− − −
− −≡ =
             
(3)
The expectation of the reaction function with regard to θi is as follows:
M
M i i i
i i i i i i
E E qE q E q 1 ( )( ( ); ) ,
2
ω
ω θ γ θθ θ
′
′ − − −
− − −
− −=
               
(4)




The direct truth-telling contract must satisfy the incentive compatibility 
constraint for Oi, that is, θ i






Oi’s (expected) information rent is defined by Ui (θi
O









O ). It is assumed that qi(θi
O) and ti(θi
O) are continuously 
differentiable. Through standard techniques used to derive the optimal 
contract in the hidden information, the first- and second- order local con- 




)≤0 and q̇i (θ i
O
)≤0, 
respectively.3 Oi’s information rent decreases in θ i
O
.
For the sake of tractability of analysis, we replace ti (θ i
O
) with Ui (θ i
O
). 
2 Ei denotes the operator of expectation with regard to θ iω.
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The optimal contract is obtained by solving the following problem:
O O
i i i i
O O O
i i i i i i i i i i
q U
E E q q U
{ ( ), ( )}
max ( ( ), ( ); ) ( ) ,ω
θ θ
π θ θ θ θ′− − −⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦             (5)
       s.t. U̇i (θ i
O )＝－qi (θ i
O ),                      (6)
        q̇i (θ i
O
)≤0,                          (7)
       Ui (θ i
O
)≥0,  ∀θ i
O
∈[0, sθ ̅].                   (8)
We assume that q̇i (θ i
O
)＜0 (which is verified ex post). Using (6), Oi’s 
information rent is strictly decreasing in θ i
O
 and (8) binds only at sθ ̅, 
that is, Ui(sθ ̅)＝0. Using integration by parts, Oi’s information rent is 
EiUi (θ i
O




)/ f O(θ i
O






)}]. Mi solves 




O O O i
i i i i i i i i i i O Oq i
FE E q q q
f{ ( )}










⎣ ⎦            
(9)
Through the FOC, the reaction function is obtained as follows:
1 ( ) ( )( ( ); ) .
2
O
O i i i i
i i i i i i
V E qq q E q
ω
ω θ γ θθ θ
′
′ − − −
− − −
− −≡ =
          
(10)
Note that (10) is obtained by replacing θ i
M
 with V(θ i
O
) in (3). The ex- 
pectation of the reaction function with regard to θ i
O
 is as follows:
O
O i i i
i i i i i i
EV E qE q E q 1 ( )( ( ); ) ,
2
ω
ω γ θθ θ
′
′ − − −
− − −
− −=







We derive the equilibrium quantity in all cases where (i) both Mi 







( )( ) .θθ
θ
≡
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choose in-house production; (ii) both Mi choose outsourcing; and (iii) Mi 
chooses in-house production and M－i chooses outsourcing. All con- 
tingent cases are denoted by (ω , ω’)∈{M, O }2.
Solving the reaction functions for i＝1, 2, (3) and (10), we obtain the 
equilibrium quantity in all cases for all θ i
M
∈[0, θ ̅ ] and θ iO∈[0, sθ ̅ ].
M M
M M M i
i i





+                       
(12)
O M M
M O M i
i i
EV Eq , 2(2 ) (2 )( ) ,
2(2 )(2 ) 2
γ γ γ θ θθ
γ γ
− + −= −
+ −               
(13)
M O O
O M O i
i i
E EV Vq , 2(2 ) (2 ) ( )( ) ,
2(2 )(2 ) 2
γ γ θ γ θθ
γ γ
− + −= −
+ −              
(14)
O O
O O O i
i i





+                     
(15)
The equilibrium quantity strictly decreases in θ i
ω by the MHRC. It should 




) is obtained by replacing θ i
M
 with V(θ i
O















From (12)-(15), we obtain the following lemma.










All proofs can be found in Appendix A. qi (θ i
ω ) is strictly decreasing; 
thus, a sufficient condition for all types to ensure positive quantities  
is obtained by Lemma 1 as follows: If EV
O＞ Eθ M (resp. EVO＜ Eθ M), 
qi
M,M
(θ ̅)＞0, qiO,M(sθ ̅)＞0 (resp. qiM,O(θ ̅)＞0, and qiO,O(sθ ̅)＞0) constitute a 
sufficient condition for a positive quantity. In the following analysis, we 
assume that the above condition is satisfied.
D. Manufacturer’s Expected Profit in the Equilibrium
To derive Mi’s expected profit in the equilibrium, we define Mi’s ex- 
pected profit by Πi
ω ,ω ’, (ω, ω’)∈{M, O}2. We obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Regardless of whether Mi chooses in-house production or 
outsourcing, Mi’s expected profit satisfies the following equation: Π i
ω ,ω ’



















CHOICE GAME BETWEEN IN-HOUSE PRODUCTION AND OUTSOURCING
＝Ei[qi
ω ,ω ’(θ i
ω )]2.
Substituting (12)-(15) into Π i
ω ,ω ’＝Ei[qi
ω ,ω ’]2 by Lemma 2, we derive 
















E EV 2 2,
2 2
(2(1 ) (1 )) ,
(2 ) (2 ) 4
θθ γ σ
γ γ
− − −Π = +





EV E 2 2,
2 2
(2(1 ) (1 )) ,
(2 ) (2 ) 4
γ θ σ
γ γ
− − −Π = +
















M－EθM]2 and σ V
2≡Ei[V(θ i





IV. Choice between In-house Production and Outsourcing
In the first stage, Mi faces the choice game between in-house pro- 
duction and outsourcing. The normal-form representation of this game 
is shown in Table 1.
In order for outsourcing to constitute a unique Nash equilibrium in 
the game, it is necessary that the decision to outsource by a manu- 
facturer must constitute the dominant strategy in the game. Therefore, 




 and Π i
M,O
＜Π i
O,O have to be satisfied. Comparing the expected profits, we obtain 
the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that qi
ω ,ω ’(θ i
ω )＞0∀θ i
M
. The sufficient condition for 
outsourcing to be selected as the unique Nash equilibrium is that the 
following inequality should be satisfied:
2 2
2 2
16( )((1 ) (1 )(1 )).
(2 ) (2 )
O M M O
V
EV E E EV
θ
θ θ γσ σ
γ γ
− − + − −− >
+ −          
(20)
As shown in Theorem 1, under the general probability distribution 
with regard to cost uncertainty, whether outsourcing is preferred de- 
pends on the relative size of expectation and variance on θ i
M
 and V(θ i
O
), 
that is, (EθM, σ θ
2) and (EVO, σ V
2
). This condition depends on the dif- 
ference in the variances of costs associated with in-house production 
and the virtual cost function V. Under the general distribution function, 
(20) also depends on the degree of product differentiation.
We consider the case wherein the manufacturer faces identical cost 





 follow the same probability distribution, f M(․)＝f O(․)
≡f (․) and s＝1. In the case of identical cost uncertainty, we obtain 
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the degree of cost uncertainty of outsourcing is identical 
to that of in-house production, then outsourcing is never chosen.
When the degree of cost uncertainty is identical, whether the rival 
chooses in-house production or outsourcing, the manufacturer expects 
to gain more profit by selecting in-house production, Π i
M,ω ’＞Π i
O,ω ’, ω ’∈ 
{M, O}. When outsourcing has no cost efficiency, the dominant strategy 
for the manufacturer is to choose in-house production in the choice 
game. Proposition 1 suggests that in order for the manufacturer to 
choose outsourcing, the decision has to be supported by cost efficiency.
The manufacturer is required to provide information rent to the out- 
sourcer when it chooses outsourcing; thus, it appears at first glance 
that if the degree of cost uncertainty is identical, the result of Propo- 
sition 1 is obviously satisfied. However, this is not obvious because the 
decrease in quantity required to reduce information rent has the sec- 
ondary effect of mitigating market competition under strategic substi- 
tutes. Proposition 1 implies that the negative effect of the loss by paying 
information rent to the outsourcer always exceeds the positive effect of 
mitigated competition under strategic interaction.
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In Theorem 1, the condition under which outsourcing is opted for by 
the manufacturer depends on the functional form of the distribution. 
However, we cannot characterize the interpretation of the condition (20) 
in a more detailed way under the general distribution function. Any 
density function can be approximated with the uniform distribution if 
the support of uncertainty is sufficiently small. Hence, for tractability, 
we consider the approximation of any density function through the 
uniform distribution with regard to uncertainty in the following analysis. 





) are represented by f M(θ i
M
)＝1/θ ̅, F M(θ iM)＝θ iM/θ (resp. f O(θ iO) 
＝1/sθ ̅, and F O(θ iO)＝θ iO/sθ ̅).
In the uniform distribution, a sufficient condition for positive quanti- 
ties is assumed as follows:
Assumption 1: 2 2
4(2 ) 1 2(2 ) 1if , and if ,




γ γ γ γ
− −< < < ≥
− − − −
which is derived in Appendix B. From the sufficient condition (20) in 
Theorem 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that θ i
ω  is uniformly distributed and Assump- 
tion 1 is satisfied. If s＜1/2, regardless of the degree of substitutability, 
outsourcing is chosen in the equilibrium. That is, if s＜1/2, Π i
O,ω ’＞Π i
M,ω ’, 
ω ’∈{M, O} ∀γ ∈[0, 1].
Proposition 2 implies that in the uniform distribution, if the degree 
of cost efficiency of outsourcing exceeds certain thresholds, that is, s
＜1/2, a manufacturer selects outsourcing regardless of the degree of 
substitutability. The choice between in-house production and outsourc- 
ing does not depend on the degree of substitutability of brand products 
in a differentiated goods market. In the model, the degree of substi- 
tutability can be interpreted to have an inverse relation to the intensity 
of market competition because when γ＝0, the market is monopolistic, 
and when γ＝1, the market is duopolistic. Thus, Proposition 2 affirms 
that whether or not outsourcing is more profitable than in-house pro- 
duction bears no relationship to the intensity of competition. In other 
words, this proposition suggests that product market competition does 
not affect the manufacturer’s decision of outsourcing versus in-house 
production, which is based only on cost efficiency.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The cost under out- 
  OUTSOURCING VS. IN-HOUSE PRODUCTION UNDER COST UNCERTAINTY 453
sourcing is different from that under in-house production because the 
former includes the information rent of the outsourcer. The manufac- 
turer enters into an exclusive contract with the outsourcer whose out- 
side opportunities do not depend on market competition. Therefore, as 
market competition does not affect the information rent of the out- 
sourcer, it does not affect the cost under outsourcing relative to that 
under in-house production.
It should be noted that although Proposition 2 is obtained under a 
uniform distribution, if cost uncertainty is sufficiently low, a similar 
result is obtained under the general distribution. Any general distri- 




≈1/θ ̅ and f O(θiO)≈1/sθ ̅ when θ ̅ is sufficiently small. Hence, ΠiO,ω ’＞Π iM,ω ’ 
is approximately satisfied if s＜1/2.
In Proposition 2, s＜1/2 is the condition according to which out- 
sourcing accrues greater expected profit than in-house production. 
Under this condition, sθ ̅＜Eθ M＝θ ̅/2 is satisfied. Therefore, this condi- 
tion implies that the upper bound of the uncertain cost in outsourcing 
is always less than the expectation of the uncertain cost in in-house 
production. As s represents (the inverse of) the cost efficiency of out- 
sourcing, the fact that the degree of cost efficiency in order for out- 
sourcing to be selected does not depend on γ implies that the degree of 
product differentiation and, as a consequence, the intensity of competi- 
tion do not affect the decision of the manufacturer to outsource. There- 
fore, the result in Proposition 2 suggests that even if market competi- 
tion intensifies, the manufacturer should decide whether to choose out- 
sourcing under cost uncertainty by evaluating only the degree of cost 
efficiency of outsourcing.
The reason why the decision to outsource does not depend on γ is 
explained as follows. When s＝1/2, the expectation and variance of θ i
M
 
are equivalent to those of V(θ i
O




tively. When s ≷ 1/2, EV
O－Eθ M ≷ 0 and σ V
2－σ θ
2 ≷ 0 are satisfied. 
Thus, (EV
O－EθM) has the same sign as (σ V
2
－σ θ
2). However, because var- 
iance is affected by the square of the size of cost uncertainty in con- 
trast with expectation, the size of the difference in variance is suffi- 
ciently greater than that in the case of expectation. Therefore, whatever 
the value of γ is, the impact of variance always exceeds that of expec- 
tation, and the relative size of the effects of variance and expectation 
determines the expected profit.
Finally, we examine how the expected total profit, which is denoted 
by EiE－i π
ω ,ω ’, affects the degree of cost efficiency. If in-house pro- 
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duction is decided upon, as no outsourcer is hired, a manufacturer 
acquires the entire total expected profit. If outsourcing is decided upon, 
as a manufacturer is required to pay information rent to an out- 
sourcer, the expected total profit is shared by the manufacturer and 
outsourcer. That is, EiE－iπ
M ,ω ’＝Πi
M,ω ’ and EiE－iπ
O,ω ’＝Πi
O,ω ’＋EiUi are 
satisfied. Clearly, although the manufacturer is not different in both 
in-house production and outsourcing when s＝1/2, the expected total 
profit, which adds the information rent to Πi
O,ω ’, is always greater in 
outsourcing than in-house production. By comparing EiE－iπ
M,M and  
EiE－iπ
O,O,4 we can clarify the expected total profits that are larger.5 For 
example, in the case of monopoly (γ＝0), EiE－iπ
M,M＜EiE－iπ
O,O if s∈(0, 
(3＋√3̅)/6). In the case of duopoly (γ＝1), if s∈(0, 9/20) or (18/35, 1], 
EiE－iπ
M,M＜EiE－iπ
O,O. If s∈(9/20, 18/35), whichever is larger of the 
two, EiE－iπ
M,M or EiE－iπ
O,O, depends on the relative sizes of s and θ ̅ (as 
derived in Appendix C). Unlike the comparison of Mi’s expected profit, 
whether in-house production and outsourcing yields a larger expected 
total profit depends on γ. In sum, although the choice by a manufac- 
turer between in-house production and outsourcing is not affected by 
γ, the size of the expected total profit is affected by γ.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the relationship between the choice of 
outsourcing versus in-house production and product differentiation in 
a Cournot model with cost uncertainty and asymmetric information 
under outsourcing. If there is asymmetric information between a man- 
ufacturer and an outsourcer, the manufacturer has to pay the informa- 
tion rent to the outsourcer when outsourcing is chosen. We demon- 
strated that the degree of product differentiation and the intensity of 
competition do not affect the choice of a manufacturer between in- 
house production and outsourcing. This result is in sharp contrast to 
that in the existing literature.
Our result differs from that in the existing literature on account of 
the difference between the models with regard to the decision of a firm 
in choosing between in-house production and outsourcing. Partial out- 
4 Even if we compare other pairs of the expected total profits, we obtain a 
similar result.
5 We did not derive this result comprehensively because the derivation is too 
complicated to be calculated.
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sourcing has been analyzed in the existing literature. The analysis of 
partial outsourcing presumes implicitly that firms can choose the op- 
timal proportion of outsourcing by adjusting the variables affecting the 
organizational structure continuously. For example, Shy and Stenbacka 
(2005) explore the model with a continuum of inputs that enable par- 
tial outsourcing to be analyzed by producing a certain portion of inputs 
for in-house and outsourcing other portions. Moreover, monitoring the 
cost of outsourcing is assumed to be strictly convex in the proportion 
of outsourcing. In the paper, firms have to choose either in-house pro- 
duction or outsourcing without any intermediate forms of production. 
Furthermore, in the paper, contrary to the existing literature, monitor- 
ing the cost of outsourcing has no diseconomy of scale and is deter- 
mined by the information rent to the outsourcer. Therefore, if the choice 
between in-house production and outsourcing is made in a non-convex 
set of alternatives and monitoring cost is decided by the differences 
between the information structure of organizational forms, the result of 
this paper will be more appropriate than that in the existing articles.
Following the prevailing view that outsourcing is fostered by inten- 
sifying competition caused by globalization, the management emphasizes 
specialization on the division that has core competence with competi- 
tive advantage and withdrawal from the non-core division that is vul- 
nerable to harsh competition. If this view is correct, as a market becomes 
more competitive, a firm loses its core competence in the market. Thus, 
firms are forecast to prefer outsourcing to in-house production in the 
midst of intense global competition. However, we present a view different 
from the prevailing one. The result in this paper suggests that based on 
the views on core competence, when the management decides on whether 
to outsource or not, it should distinguish between technological and 
competitive advantages. The decision to outsource is affected only by 
technological advantage, such as cost efficiency, and not by competitive 
advantage through proper market positioning, such as the degree of 
product differentiation.
(Received 31 August 2009; Revised 13 November 2009; 24 November 
2009)
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. 
γ θθ θ θ θ
γ
−− = − =
−
, , , ,
2
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
4
O M
M O M M O O O M
i i i i
EV Eq q q q
≷0 if and only if EVO≷EθM.
Proof of Lemma 2. As Mi is not aware of its own type θ i
M
, when 
choosing in-house production, Mi expects Π i









) to be obtained. As E－iπi＝(pi(qi, E－i q－i)－θi
M
)qi by (2) and pi(qi, E－i q－i)
－θ i
M
＝qi by (1) and (3), we obtain Π i
M,ω ’＝Ei[qi
M,ω ’]2. When choosing 
outsourcing, Mi must provide information rent to Oi. As Oi’s expected 
information rent is EiUi(θ i
O
), Mi expects Π i






















O,ω ’]. As EiUi＝Ei [qi
O,ω ’(F/f )] is 
satisfied by integrating by parts, Π i
O,ω ’＝Ei[qi
O,ω ’]2 is satisfied.          □ 












＞16(EVO－EθM)A/(2＋γ )2(2－γ )2 and σ V
2
－σ θ
2＞16(EV O－Eθ M )B/(2＋γ )2 
(2－γ )2, respectively, where A≡(1－γ ) (1－Eθ M )＋(1－EV O )＞0 and B≡  
(1－Eθ M )＋(1－γ )(1－EV O)＞0. As EV O ≷ Eθ M if and only if A≶B, 16
(EV
O－Eθ M)B/(2＋γ )2(2－γ )2＞16(EV O－Eθ M)A/(2＋γ )2(2－γ )2 is satisfied 
regardless of the sign of (EVO＝EθM). Thus, the sufficient condition for 
outsourcing to be the dominant strategy is σ V
2
－σ θ
2＞16(EVO－EθM )B/  
(2＋γ )2(2－γ )2.                                                          □











2E(F/f )＋(4－γ 2){F (θ i)/f (θ i)}]/2 
(4－γ 2)＞0, qi
M,M (θ i)＞qi
O,M (θ i) and qi
M,O (θ i)＞qi
O,O (θ i) are satisfied for all  
θ i∈[0, θ̅ ]. Applying Πi
ω ,ω ’＝Ei [qi
ω ,ω ’(θ i)]









.                                                   □
Proof of Proposition 2. As Eθ M＝θ ̅/2, EV O＝sθ ̅, σ θ2＝θ ̅2/12, and σ V2＝
s2θ ̅2/3 in the uniform distribution, the left-hand and right-hand sides 
of (20) in Theorem 1 are calculated as (2s＋1)(2s－1)θ ̅2/12 and 8(2s－1) 
θ ̅(1－(θ ̅/2)＋(1－γ ) (1－sθ ̅ ))/(2＋γ )2(2－γ )2, respectively. When s＝1/2, 




 is satisfied. If and only if 
s ≷1/2, (2s＋1)θ ̅/12 ≷ 8(1－(θ ̅/2)＋(1－γ ̅ )(1－sθ ̅̅ ))/(2＋γ ̅ )2(2－γ ̅ )2. Repre- 
senting this inequality with regard to s, we obtain s ≷ s̃≡{96(2－γ )－  
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((4－γ 2)2＋48)θ ̅ ̅}/2((4－γ 2)2＋48(1－γ ̅ ))θ ̅. s̃＞1 if and only if θ ̅＜32̅(2－γ ̅ )/ 
{(4－γ 2)2＋32(1－γ )＋16}. As 32(2－γ )/{(4－γ 2)2＋32(1－γ )＋16}≥1, s̃＞1 
is satisfied. Thus, (20) is satisfied for all s∈(0, 1/2) and not satisfied 
for all s∈(1/2, 1].                                                      □
Appendix B
Derivation of Assumption 1. By Lemma 1, a sufficient condition for 




O,M(sθ ̅)＞0 (resp. qiM,O(θ ̅)＞0 and qiO,O (sθ ̅)＞0). In the uniform 
distribution, EV


















(θ̅)). Thus, the sufficient condition is as 
follows: qi
O,M
(sθ ̅)＞0 if s≥1/2 and qiM,O (θ ̅)＞0 if s＜1/2. qiO,M(sθ ̅)＞0 if 
and only if θ ̅＜2(2－γ )/{(8－γ 2)s－γ }, and qiM,O (θ ̅)＞0 if and only if θ ̅＜4  
(2－γ )/{8－γ 2－4γ s}.
Appendix C
Comparison of expected total profits. EiE－iπ
M,M＜EiE－iπ





O) {FO (θ i
O)/ f O(θ i
O) } ]. Substituting (15), (16), and 
(19) into the above inequality and arranging them under a uniform 
distribution, we obtain the following inequality:
2
2 48 ((2 ) 12)(2 ) 0.
24
s s γ θγθ γ − + ++ − − <
               
(21)
When γ＝0, Assumption 1 can be represented as θ ̅＜1 if s＜1/2, and θ̅
＜1/2s if s≥1/2. (21) is calculated as s＜1－θ ̅/3. If s＜1/2, (21) is 
always satisfied. If s≥1/2, in order for (21) and θ ̅＜1/2s to be 
satisfied, 6s
2－6s＋1＜0 must be satisfied, which is replaced by      
(1/2≤) s＜(3＋√3̅)/6 ≈ 0.789. Thus, when γ＝0, EiE－iπ
M,M＜EiE－iπ
O,O if  
s ∈ (0, (3＋√3̅)/6). When γ ＝1, Assumption 1 can be represented as  
θ ̅＜4/(7－4s) if s＜1/2 and θ ̅＜2/(7s－1) if s≥1/2. (21) is calculated  
as θ ̅s2＋s－{(16－7θ ̅)/6}＜0, which is equivalent to s1＜s＜s2, where s1≡  
{                     }/6θ ̅＜0 and s2≡ {                     }/6θ ̅ ＞0. If 
s ∈(0, s2), (21) is satisfied. s2 is the strictly decreasing function with 
regard to θ ̅. It is satisfied if s ∈(0, 9/20) or (18/35, 1], s2＞1; other- 
wise, s2＜1. Thus, in the case of γ＝1, if s∈(0, 9/20) or (18/35, 1],  
3 6 (16 7 ) 9θ θ− − − + 3 6 (16 7 ) 9θ θ− + − +
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EiE－iπ
M,M＜EiE－iπ
O,O. If s∈(9/20, 18/35), the larger value depends on 
the relative size of s and θ ̅. If s＜s2, EiE－iπ M,M＜EiE－iπO,O.
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